


IN REVERSE

The disintegration of “integrated transport” policy in Scotland,
1999-2003



TRANSform Scotland
the campaign for sustainable transport

**In Reverse:
The disintegration of
“integrated transport” policy
in Scotland, 1999-2003**

Published by TRANS*form* Scotland,
April 2003

72 Newhaven Road, Edinburgh,
EH6 5QG, Scotland
Tel: +44 (0)131 467 7714
Fax: +44 (0)131 554 8656
info@transformscotland.org.uk
<http://www.transformscotland.org.uk>

Authors: Colin Howden & Sharon
Gardner.

Colin Howden is the Campaign
Manager of TRANS*form* Scotland.
Sharon Gardner is a researcher with
TRANS*form* Scotland.

Design: Colin Howden

Front cover image:
Reproduced courtesy of Glasgow
Letters on Architecture and Space
(GLAS) / Tatjana Schneider -
<http://www.glas-collective.com>

In Reverse

The disintegration of “integrated transport” policy in Scotland, 1999-2003

Contents

Executive Summary

1. **Disintegrating transport policy**
2. **Analysis of 1999 manifesto commitments against delivery, 1999-2003**
3. **Delivering the Tory manifesto too:
The Executive’s £1 billion road-building programme**
4. **Moving Scottish transport forward again:
A manifesto for *sustainable* transport**

Appendices

1. Dates in the disintegration
2. What Labour & the Lib Dems said they’d do:
The text of their 1999 commitments
3. What Labour & the Lib Dems didn’t tell us:
The Executive’s £1 billion road-building programme
4. And Scotland’s roads programme doesn’t stop there...
5. Double standards in the delivery of transport
 - 5.1 Waiting for the bus, 1999-2003
(by Gregor McAbery)
 - 5.2 Scottish Executive cycling policy, 1999-2003
(by Dave du Feu)
 - 5.3 Running late: delays in rail delivery, 1999-2003
(by David Hansen)

Executive Summary

Background to this report

'In Reverse' sets out how Scottish Executive transport policy failed to deliver during the first term of the Scottish Parliament. The report conducts a detailed critique of Executive policy - and how implementation diverged from this.

The report reviews, against delivery, the 1999 pre-election manifesto commitments of the parties that made up the 1999-2003 Scottish Executive and the pledges made in the Partnership Agreement that immediately followed the election. The report also sets out an account of the new road-building programme, included because of its prominence in the Executive's expenditure programme.

The final part of the report (Section 4) sets out the challenges the incoming Scottish Executive must tackle if it wants the Scottish transport sector to contribute towards a more sustainable, and equitable, Scotland.

Key findings

In our analysis of the commitments made by Labour and the Liberal Democrats in 1999, it becomes clear that, once in office, the Scottish Executive *did* deliver on a number of these pledges, including enabling powers for road user charging (Section 2). Around a third of the manifesto commitments were delivered in full, and another third to some degree of success. There was also a significant additional commitment to stabilise road traffic levels in Scotland.

What is of more concern however is that Labour and the Liberal Democrats *also appear poised to deliver the 1999 Tory manifesto programme of more road-building and cheaper car use*.¹ Section 3 sets out the road-building programme that the Scottish Executive has put in place since 1999: this is in essence an expanded version of the roads programme inherited from the Tory Scottish Office in 1997.

Labour and the Liberal Democrats would, of course, protest that they have increased levels of funding for public transport - and in this they would be being truthful. It would indeed have been difficult to invest less than their Tory predecessors in the Scottish Office had done. Yet it was understood that the defining characteristic of Labour and Lib Dem policies after 1999 would be that they would prioritise sustainable transport investment over the failed Tory prescription of "predict and provide" road-building. This has however *not* been the case; instead, we have a policy of "more of everything": certainly, there has been more funding for public transport yet traffic-generating and environmentally-destructive road-building still dominates. There now appears to be no chance of the transport sector contributing to, rather than undermining, the Executive's climate change commitments.

Study constraints

The principal difficulty in producing this report has been the lack of transparency in presentation of Scottish Executive statistical materials. As such, the report is an attempt to set out our knowledge of what has gone on – against what has often been a very confusing presentation of source materials.

¹ The Conservatives pledged to reduce petrol prices, increase spending on road-building, and use public/private partnerships to deliver new roads. All of these have been delivered either by the Scottish Executive, or as in the case of reduced fuel duty, by the UK government.

1. Disintegrating transport policy

The first four years of the Scottish Parliament set back hopes for a more environmentally and socially just transport system. Despite the good intentions of the 1998 Transport White Papers,² delivery on this policy framework has been abysmal. Instead of priority treatment for public transport, since 1999 the Scottish Executive has, as its effective priority, put in place a £1 billion trunk road-building programme. In doing so, the Labour / Liberal Democrat coalition reinforced the environmental and social damage caused by Scotland's over-reliance on private cars and road freight. This roads programme, larger even than that advocated by roads lobby organisations at the time of the creation of the Parliament, threatens delivery of the sustainable development agenda in Scotland. Such is the current focus of the Scottish Executive on grandiose mega-projects,³ it is difficult to differentiate Scottish Labour transport policy from transport policy produced by the likes of the Confederation of British Industry.

Labour set out in their 1999 manifesto that *"Our biggest challenge is to create a high quality, accessible and affordable public transport system."* Yet despite these laudable aims, the party's main programme of transport spending once in office has been in more road-building *not* in better public transport. It is clearly an embarrassment to Scotland's record on the environment that the largest transport project in Scotland should be an elevated urban motorway - the M74 Northern Extension across south Glasgow (see Box 1.1, below). This project - according to independent consultants commissioned by the Executive - will markedly increase traffic congestion and pollution levels in the city,⁴ and will do nothing but harm to the majority of households in Glasgow that have no access to a private car.⁵ Yet inexplicably there has arisen a widespread political and media consensus that this project needs to proceed.

Box 1.1

Disintegrated transport: the M74 Northern Extension

The most damaging of the projects bulldozed though has been Glasgow's M74, the largest urban motorway project in Britain, and perhaps in the whole of Europe. The project, five miles of elevated multi-lane motorway slicing across south Glasgow, is a remnant of 1960s-style roads planning. No independent analysis of alternatives has ever been carried out.

The M74 will be as devastating to the communities of Glasgow's Southside as the M8 was to the north of the city. Consultants for the Scottish Executive last year spelt out the massive increase in commuter traffic that will head for the motorway through Southside communities. The inequity of so much money being squandered on five miles of motorway in a city where the majority of households (57%) have no access to a car is startling.

In March 2003, in a note in an Executive press release, it emerged that the project would cost not £250 million, but between £375 million and £500 million. Was it just coincidental that the Executive should announce this doubling of the price of the motorway just as Parliament was wound up before the election?

² The White Papers (one from the then Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions & another from the then Scottish Office) promoted an "integrated transport" framework. Amongst other things, they set out why road-building had failed as the basis for transport planning and proposed various charging mechanisms aimed at road traffic demand management (e.g. road user charging and workplace parking levies).

³ Following car use, walking and bus use are, respectively, the most frequently used modes of transport in Scotland - see <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/stats/bulletins/00160-13.asp>. They are also the modes of transport that those on lower incomes are most dependent upon - see <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/stats/bulletins/00160-20.asp>. Yet these modes of transport continue to be largely ignored as a priority: the Public Transport Fund, in its five rounds from 1998 to 2002, awarded £235 million to local public transport, walking & cycling projects - considerably less than the price of the five miles of the M74.

⁴ The Final Reports from the Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies (CSTCS) were published in June 2002. Assessment of the impacts of the proposed urban M74 suggested that its construction would have no significant impact on traffic levels on the Kingston Bridge; increase traffic levels on Glasgow South Side radial roads; markedly increase traffic levels entering Glasgow from the east; and add to existing problems of congestion on the M8 and M77 west and south of the city (see pages 35-48 and Figures 5.5-5.17). The report concluded that Glasgow in 2010 with the M74 scheme built "shows a network which is more congested (even with the additional capacity provided by the M74) than in 2000." (ibid, pp. 42, 5.6.3).

⁵ It makes it all the more remarkable that the proponents of the road are happy to suggest that building an elevated motorway across your country's largest city "Makes Complete Sense", as is insisted by the campaign strapline used on the M74 website <http://www.m74completion.com>

The routine soundbite from the Scottish Executive Ministers is the claim that, by 2005-06, 70% of transport expenditure will be on public transport. Even taking this at face value, and setting aside for one moment questions as to why continuing a Tory road-building programme should for so long take priority in their spending plans over investing in public transport, real questions emerge about the robustness of this figure and what it means for public transport improvements.

Given that the M74 has increased in price by up to £250 million in price since the "70%" figure was first floated in the September 2002 spending review, does this price over-run for a committed road project, in a constrained budget situation, mean that sustainable transport investment will lose out? Given the Executive's claim to a £3 billion 10-year infrastructure spending programme, and given that at least £1 billion will certainly be on new road-building, does that £250 million increase mean that, at a stroke, over 10% of the Executive's 10-year spending programme for public transport has been wiped out? Given that the most of the rail projects have yet to be allocated annual funding streams, unlike the projects in the Executive's roads programme, will these public transport projects be disadvantaged when other road projects similarly inflate in price? These are, to a degree, speculations but it is difficult to do otherwise given the lack of transparency and consistency in presentation of transport expenditure plans.

Confidence in the Executive's own grasp of its plans are not aided when the Transport Minister, giving evidence to the Parliament's Transport and the Environment Committee rail inquiry, recognised that the Executive's understanding of Scottish rail expenditure was far from clear. The competency of the Minister's advisors certainly come into question when, as in the key spending graph in the Transport Delivery Report (see page 19 of 'Scotland's Transport: Delivering Improvements'), the key indicating roads spending & public transport spending is clearly reversed!

All carrot and no stick

Alongside sustainable transport investment, Labour and the Liberal Democrats promised to take action to implement measures to make road users pay for their external social and environmental costs. As long as road transport continues to pay for only a fraction of its external environmental, social and economic costs, it is clear that such measures need to be implemented.⁶ Indeed, it is simply the application of the "Polluter Pays Principle" in transport that road users should pay for the costs that they inflict on others.

The success of the congestion charge implemented by the Greater London Authority in February 2003 shows the applicability of such measures. The Scottish Executive has at least put in place a legal framework for local authorities to implement urban road user charges.⁷ Yet despite this, there has been no implementation, either by Scottish local authorities or by the Executive itself, of economic instruments aimed at road traffic demand management.

The only current proposal in Scotland is from the Labour-run City of Edinburgh Council. However, this proposal has been undermined by political opportunism of the Liberal Democrat opposition group, in wilful disregard of its national party policy. In their opposition to the proposal, the Edinburgh Lib Dems have allied themselves with the Tories.⁸ Yet the political incoherence of the Tories on transport is perhaps best exemplified by their position on road user charging. It is remarkable that a party that has often styled itself as a "party of the market" should be so opposed to a market-based economic instrument. The reality is that the Tories and

⁶ For example, the University of Leeds' Institute for Transport Studies reported in July 2001 that "*far from being over-taxed, motorists pay only a third to a half of the costs they impose on society... [The report] claims the cost of congestion, pollution, infrastructure maintenance and accidents far outweighs the £32 billion fuel and car taxes collected each year*" (Financial Times, 07/08/01).

⁷ In the absence of the Scottish Parliament, however, this would have been transposed into Scottish law from the equivalent Westminster Act so is only a marginal achievement of the Parliament.

⁸ The destabilisation of the Edinburgh Labour Group's plans for road user charging is indeed one of the few issues in the field of transport that the Liberal Democrats in Scotland, in the period between 1999 and 2003, had discernible impact.

other roads lobby opponents of road user charging are unable to offer any credible alternatives for controlling traffic growth.

Democracy in action

Edinburgh's congestion charging proposal, though talked about for a decade and again delayed until at least 2006, has now been through two city-wide consultation exercises - both supportive in result - and yet will now be subject to a city-wide referendum.

It is perhaps instructive of the mood of transport decision-making in Scotland over the past four years that a proposal aimed at reducing pollution and congestion should be deemed necessary to be dependent on public referendum while it should not be deemed necessary to precede the construction of pollution- and traffic-generating motorways. Politicians have oft called for mature debate on road user charging yet there seems to be no stomach for a mature debate on whether there should be a continuation of the same old failed policies of "predict and provide" road-building.

In reverse across the UK

Some of the failings in transport delivery in Scotland have however fallen outwith the control of the Scottish Parliament. Transport is, of course, still a part-reserved issue and Westminster must take some responsibility for conditions in Scotland.

Three issues come to the fore. Firstly, the long drawn out death of Railtrack following the Hatfield rail crash further damaged confidence that Britain's rail industry structure can deliver. Secondly, the dropping of the Fuel Duty Strategy following the direct actions of the road haulage industry in September 2000 emasculated climate change strategy for the transport sector.⁹ Thirdly, the gung ho attitude of the UK Department for Transport towards air transport growth, despite the enormous environmental consequences of this most polluting form of transport, threatens to undermine the entire UK performance on tackling climate change.¹⁰

There is of course no evidence that these matters would have been handled in a more responsible fashion had they been in the control of the Scottish Parliament.

The disintegration of "integrated transport" in Scotland

The problem with transport in Scotland has lain not with the "integrated transport" policy framework, most of which gives a sound footing for delivery of sustainable transport, but rather with the political will to follow through on this agenda. In this, the Labour Party has been far too timid in its treatment of roads lobby demands for ever-cheaper and ever-quicker road use - policies that have for decades proven themselves demonstrable failures. In effect, Labour and the Lib Dems have allowed motoring organisations to have it both ways: that road-building should take priority, but also to dismiss public transport by saying that motorists won't use it until it is considerably better.

⁹ The draft UK Programme on Climate Change Programme of March 2000 concluded in its section on fiscal measures in transport that "*The fuel duty escalator ha[d] been very successful*" (page 88, paragraph 30). The fuel duty escalator was the principle part of the UK Fuel Duty Strategy aimed at reducing climate change emissions from transport, calculated as reducing 1-2.5 MtC (million tonnes of carbon) annually. By comparison, it estimated that implementation of the UK Government's proposals for road user charges and workplace parking levies would save only 0.6 MtC annually (ibid, page 115). The largest proposed saving from transport, at 4MtC, came from European Commission agreements with car manufacturers to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from cars.

¹⁰ The UK Government's leading environmental advisory body, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), in its November 2002 report 'The Environmental Effects of Civil Aircraft in Flight' highlighted the inconsistency of facilitating growth in air transport with climate change and sustainable development (sections 5.2 - 5.3). The RCEP concluded that the failure for the air transport industry to pay for its external costs through an aviation fuel tax or an emissions charge represents a "*large subsidy at the expense of other modes of transport*" (5.6 - 5.7) and that "*a failure to invest in rail infrastructure and a failure to reflect environmental externalities in the cost of air transport*" (5.20) had undermined the viability of rail alternatives. See <http://www.rcep.org.uk>

The “integrated transport” policy framework was meant to link delivery on transport with progress on other policy areas. Hence, the transport sector is meant to reduce environmental damage, improve health, promote social inclusion, increase economic activity, and so forth. For example, current guidance on transport and planning (NPPG17) sets out an admirable framework for tackling sprawl – yet planning decisions still all too often allow edge-of-town sprawl to continue.¹¹ Perhaps there has been a naïve assumption that because a sustainable policy framework had been created that sustainable delivery on transport would follow.

The Executive’s policy on transport and the environment highlights its disintegrating transport policy. Greenhouse gas emissions from transport are inextricably linked to road traffic levels (as there appears no prospect in anything but the very long-term for a move away from fossil fuels as the dominant energy source). As such, it was welcome that the Scottish Executive, in 2002, set a target to stabilise road traffic levels.¹² Yet there appears little prospect of this target being achieved, and hence climate change impacts reduced, while it persists with a £1 billion road-building programme. This road programme will stimulate road traffic growth ahead of the 27% growth that the Scottish Executive itself forecasts will occur by 2021. It is difficult to square Executive objectives of stabilising traffic levels and reducing climate change emissions with a delivery priority that will generate traffic growth and increase emissions.

Delivery on transport in Scotland has all too often reflected narrow political judgement rather than being objective-led.¹³ While the Scottish Executive in its admirable ‘Learn to Let Go’ travel awareness campaign was appraising car drivers of the need to drive less, its very own policies have instead gone a long way to encouraging car use.¹⁴

Certainly, the Executive has not been helped by a business lobby determined, as in the case of the dropping of the workplace parking levy from the Transport Bill proposals, to overturn anything that threatens their perceived interests. Nor has the obsession of the media towards transport mega-projects helped. Yet the environmental and social consequences created by the over-use of the private car and road haulage *are simply not going to go away*. While there is a variety of views on how to tackle the problems, there is still a remarkable level of agreement that there are too many cars and lorries on the roads, that they create too much environmental damage, and that public transport and rail freight must be substantially improved if they are to provide quality alternatives. The task at hand will be whether the next Scottish Executive is prepared to take action to bring these wishes to fruition - rather than simply making things even worse.

Delivering sustainable transport

Firstly, there needs to be a **fundamental review of the Executive’s civil service staffing on transport**. Wendy Alexander, the then Transport Minister, noted as much at the March 2002 launch of the Transport Delivery Report that delivering public transport in Scotland was difficult because the existing Scottish Executive officials’ skill set was “entirely based around road building.” It has often been observed that one of the reasons why delivery on road-building appears to be easier to achieve than delivery on sustainable transport is because of the disproportionate amount of Scottish Executive civil servants employed in the Roads Divisions at Victoria Quay compared to those employed in areas charged with delivering sustainable transport. There is little chance of achieving shifts to

¹¹ See, for example, Straiton on the Edinburgh City Bypass, or the “Golden Mile” outside Inverness.

¹² Albeit that the time period for the target, 20 years, from 2001 to 2021 was too long-term, and featured no interim targets.

¹³ In contrast to its own Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidelines (STAG). It is noteworthy that while STAG recommends an objective-led approach for local authority projects that its own prime transport policy document, the transport delivery report ‘Scotland’s Transport: Delivering Improvements’ (March 2002) in general lacked progress indicators and targets against which “delivery” can be measured. Such objectives as were contained were mainly relegated to the end of the document as “Monitoring Progress” rather than being at the core of the document.

¹⁴ It is perhaps worth noting that some of the more hopeful signs in Scottish public transport have been achieved largely without government intervention. The rapid recorded growth in patronage on Glasgow bus network (passenger numbers up 10% in 18 months) has occurred in a largely deregulated market while ScotRail, despite the myriad rail industry problems, have delivered more than their franchise requirement in terms of purchase of new rolling stock.

sustainable modes when a disproportionate amount of the Scottish Executive's own resources are aimed at road-building. It is hardly surprising that Scotland has such low levels of cycling and declining levels of walking when the Executive chooses, as it did in early 2002, to abolish the Branch (not even a Division) devoted to promoting these most sustainable forms of transport.

Secondly, **the transport debate is going to have to get rather more sophisticated than it currently stands.** One of the key problems with mainstream discussions of transport is that it is fixated with artefacts - motorways, airports, train lines, cycle lanes - rather than whether people have a reasonable ability to go where they need to get to. While government has, in principle, accepted the principle of "accessibility" as a key policy underpinning, its investment strategy still promotes further mobility - with all the environmental and social problems that that entails.




Thirdly, there is **need for better formal scrutiny of transport in the Scottish Parliament and elsewhere.** This is especially relevant given the intransparency of Executive presentation. In England, UK Government policy implementation is scrutinised by the House of Commons' Transport Select Committee and Environment Audit Committee and by the Commission for Integrated Transport; Scotland needs similar checks on policy formation and implementation. The Parliament's Transport and the Environment Committee, provided it in future takes a more representative set of witnesses, may be able to play a role in securing close monitoring, and modification where necessary, of the Executive's transport delivery programme.

Lastly, **choices will have to be made about what should get priority for scarce financial resources available for delivering transport.** Currently this is heavily skewed towards unsustainable programmes that will worsen existing transport trends. The Executive has now also committed itself to a long list of public transport projects (mainly rail & tram) yet serious doubts exist as to whether aspirations can be financed given markedly more swift allocation of funds to delivery of road schemes compared to rail schemes, and problems with rail industry delivery structures. The dominance of infrastructure projects in current Executive spending plans risks neglecting "softer" issues such as public transport service quality, fares policy, buses, walking, cycling, and local quality of life issues.

2. Analysis of 1999 manifesto commitments against delivery, 1999-2003

The 1999 Scottish Parliament election manifesto commitments of the Scottish Labour Party and Scottish Liberal Democrats, and the resulting May 1999 Partnership Agreement between the two coalition parties, are analysed below. The full text of the commitments is presented in Appendix 2.

The progress against these commitments have been evaluated, with this simple key indicating the success or otherwise of the Scottish Executive on its pre- and post-election commitments:

	No U-turns! Commitment achieved.
	In trouble Commitment not achieved.
	In reverse Gone backwards on commitment.



The analysis reflects *firstly*, whether the manifesto pledge has been carried out, and *secondly*, whether or not there has been any progress towards a more sustainable transport system as a result.



Findings




As can be seen below, delivery against the manifesto commitments was mixed. Around one-third (five) of the commitments made were delivered, another third (six) were delivered in part, although often with minimal beneficial effect, while another third (five) were either not delivered or made worse by the Executive's actions.



The analysis only rates delivery against the commitments made in 1999 and is thus only a partial analysis of Executive delivery. The major new programme of expenditure committed to has been a massive road-building programme: this is discussed in detail in Section 3.




Finally, it should be remembered that many of the Transport Act provisions would, in the absence of a Scottish Parliament, have been transposed into Scottish law from the equivalent Westminster Transport Act and are thus arguably a marginal benefit of the creation of the Parliament.




GENERAL POLICY ISSUES					
	Commitment	Document			TRANSform Scotland assessment
		SLP	SLD	PA	
	Tackle pollution			Yes	<p>At a local level, the National Air Quality Strategy exists to monitor air pollution, yet the targets set are likely to be missed in 2005, with many local authorities late in putting in place action plans.</p> <p>The Executive's public transport and rail freight spending commitments may help to reduce air pollution and climate change emissions <i>if</i> they produce a modal shift to public transport and away from car and lorry use. However, the Executive's £1 billion road-building programme will generate yet more pollution and may well counteract these investments.</p> <p>Air transport is the most polluting form of travel yet the Executive has promoted uncontrolled expansion of this sector.</p> <p>Nationally, the Scottish Executive has failed to set a national target for reducing climate change emissions. The lack of a national climate change target, and a sectoral target for transport, means that there is no clear environmental framework for tackling the most serious environmental impact of the transport sector.</p>
	Reduce dependence on cars			Yes	<p>Despite many commendable planning policies (e.g. NPPG17 and NPPG6), all too many planning decisions still favour dispersed and car-oriented development.</p> <p>To reduce car use people must be able to access work and services locally. Yet the continued development of edge-of-town retail encourages car use and discriminate against those that do not have access to cars (34% of households nationwide). The Executive has done little to halt this trend, allowing developments such as extensions to Braehead to go ahead, despite such developments being overwhelmingly car dependent.</p> <p>A decade after its opening, Edinburgh Park may now be on the verge of obtaining a rail station. The West Edinburgh Planning Framework, while taking more account of transport needs, give no assurance that sustainable transport modal share access will be higher than is the case for existing West Edinburgh business locations.</p>


	Commitment	Document			TRANSform Scotland assessment
		SLP	SLD	PA	
	Balance needs of car users and non-car users	Yes			<p>The Executive's roads programme is aimed towards already highly-mobile car users. The spending imbalance sits uneasily with its commitments to social justice: lower income groups are more likely to be negatively affected by increasing road traffic levels, while children from lower income groups are four times more likely to be killed or seriously injured than those from higher socio-economic groups in road crashes.</p> <p>Transport delivery should have a social inclusion audit so that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adequate amounts are allocated to transport modes disproportionately used by low income parts of the population (principally buses and walking); • Efforts are made to make bus travel more competitive on price terms with car travel, reversing the trend of recent decades; • Measures that reduce impacts on vulnerable communities (e.g. speed reducing measures, traffic calming, designated road speed hierarchy) receive priority for investment.
	Set up regional transport partnerships		Yes	Yes	<p>Regional transport partnerships have been set up in South East Scotland (SESTRAN), the West of Scotland (WESTRANS), North East Scotland (NESTRANS) and the Highlands and Islands (HITRANS).</p> <p>There is however little evidence of the success of this voluntarist approach to transport planning: a lack of budgetary responsibility and reliance on voluntary arrangements has limited their effectiveness. Their unstable nature tends to lead to controversial issues being avoided, with the lowest common denominator becoming the norm in decision-making.</p> <p>A particular problem has arisen with the regional transport partnership in North East Scotland (NESTRANS) where the agenda of the partnership has been captured by a business lobby representative - Aberdeen Chamber of Commerce. By contrast, community-based organizations (such as Aberdeen Environmental Forum) have been refused membership. The "partnership" approach is clearly flawed where the delivery of transport is skewed by the specific vested interests of business lobby organisations.</p>

ROAD TRAFFIC DEMAND MANAGEMENT					
	Commitment	Document			TRANSform Scotland assessment
		SLP	SLD	PA	
	Introduce legislation for road user charging	Yes	Yes	Yes	<p>The Transport (Scotland) Act 2001 successfully introduced legislation for urban road user charging (“congestion charging”) schemes.</p> <p>However, the proposed legislation for trunk road user charging was dropped following opposition from roads lobby groups and other political parties. The decision to exclude enabling powers for trunk road charging leaves the Scottish Executive with no effective means of controlling traffic growth on the trunk road network.</p> <p>The Executive has failed to take the lead in presenting a case for charging, leaving all responsibility with local authorities. The result has been that only one local authority (Edinburgh) is currently considering this. Even here, nothing will happen before 2006 - if at all - despite early evidence of the success of the London congestion charging scheme. The only other Scottish local authority to seriously consider a road user charge (Aberdeen) dropped its proposal following media and business lobby opposition.</p>
	Introduce legislation for workplace parking levy	Yes	Yes	Yes	<p>Following lobbying by business groups, enabling powers were dropped by the Executive during consideration of the Transport (Scotland) Act.</p> <p>The equivalent legislation has been introduced in England and several local authorities are planning implementation. This means that yet another possible tool for controlling traffic has been shelved.</p>
	Allow ring-fencing of funds for transport	Yes	Yes	Yes	<p>The Transport Act introduced legislation that allows local authorities to ring-fence funds raised (“hypothecation”) from charging schemes to be re-invested in local transport provision.</p> <p>The only local authority that is planning to take advantage of this facility is Edinburgh (see above).</p>

WALKING, CYCLING & LIVING STREETS					
	Commitment	Document			TRANSform Scotland assessment
		SLP	SLD	PA	
	Extend support for walking & cycling	Yes	Yes		<p>These are the two most sustainable methods of travel, and ones that have the potential to make a major contribution to improving Scotland's grim public health record. Walking remains the second most common mode of transport in Scotland yet remains virtually ignored in transport circles. A draft consultative walking strategy was published in early 2003 but there is as yet no action plan in this area.</p> <p>Progress was made when the Scottish Executive set up the 'Cycling, Walking and Safer Streets' Branch at Victoria Quay. However, the early 2002 decision to merge this into the Road Safety Branch demonstrates the limited understanding of the importance of these transport modes.</p> <p>There has been an increase in financial support from the Cycling, Walking and Safer Streets allocations to local authorities and via Public Transport Fund awards. However, the cessation of this second fund raises the prospect that funding for delivering these most sustainable and healthy modes of transport will fall in the course of the Parliament's second term unless alternatives arrangements are made.</p>
	More pedestrian zones & traffic calming		Yes		<p>Progress on achieving more civilized streets remains terminally slow. The abolition of the CWSS Branch indicates the low priority given by the Scottish Executive to this fundamental "quality of life" area of public policy.</p> <p>The Transport Act gave powers to local authorities to set up Home Zones. However, despite supportive noises from Ministers, the ring-fenced funding for implementing Home Zones remains at zero. This contrasts unfavourably with England where the Home Zones Challenge Fund has provided £30 million to deliver 61 schemes. In Scotland, there are only 4 pilot schemes, none of which has received central government financial support.</p>

PUBLIC TRANSPORT					
	Commitment	Document			TRANSform Scotland assessment
		SLP	SLD	PA	
	Create a high quality public transport system	Yes			<p>For too many public transport users the experience is still one of poor quality: with cleanliness, punctuality, affordability and access all remaining problematic.</p> <p>Government investment in public transport has increased - albeit from a negligible base. Yet while feasibility studies proliferate, committed spend on delivering new public transport is harder to identify. It remains to be seen whether the Executive's pre-election commitments towards new rail schemes will be delivered.</p> <p>Most new investment in bus services has come from the operators themselves with little or no public support for vehicle renewals, etc. The Executive has set an unambitious bus trip growth target of 5% in total by 2006 despite annual rates of growth higher than this being recorded in some areas.</p>
	Deliver a national timetable information service	Yes	Yes		<p>The national timetable telephone enquiry service, Traveline, has been set up and the accompanying website launched later, in December 2002.</p> <p>Traveline has, however, not yet been adequately publicised (e.g. no high-profile national media campaign to promote it). The website is not user-friendly for those not aware of stop names, it being lacking in maps. Importantly, the service doesn't take account of temporary changes in operating conditions resulting from, e.g., route diversions.</p>
	Deliver a concessionary fare scheme		Yes	Yes	<p>Local concessionary fare schemes for elderly and disabled passengers were introduced in October 2002.</p> <p>In practice, it may have been better to introduce a national concessionary fare scheme. The scheme is unequal in application: in the West of Scotland, the scheme allows trips across the Strathclyde Passenger Transport region; in Aberdeen, however, the scheme only allows trips within the City boundary.</p>

	Commitment	Document			TRANSform Scotland assessment
		SLP	SLD	PA	
	Extend bus priority	Yes			<p>The Public Transport Fund has given money for more bus priority lanes - e.g. as in Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow.</p> <p>Yet a lot more remains to be done: in funding terms, bus services remains a low priority for the Scottish Executive. As a first step, there needs to be better maintenance and enforcement of the existing bus priority networks; capital payments for the installation of bus priority have not always been followed by revenue support to maintain these facilities.</p>
	Extend rail electrification		Yes		<p>Nothing has been done to achieve electrification of rail lines. Scotland continues to have one of the lowest proportions of electrified rail networks by European standards.</p>
	Introduce light rail		Yes		<p>One of the few genuinely praiseworthy commitments by the Scottish Executive has been the £375 million pre-election spending commitment towards delivery of two tram lines in Edinburgh (by around 2009).</p> <p>Scotland (and in particular Glasgow) remains some years behind England, where light rail lines are already operational in a number of cities, and a long way behind most continental countries.</p>

FREIGHT					
	Commitment	Document			TRANSform Scotland assessment
		SLP	SLD	PA	
	Shift freight from road to rail	Yes	Yes	Yes	<p>There has been a doubling of budget for Freight Facilities Grant for rail freight and inland waterways, and extension of the scheme to coastal and short sea shipping.</p> <p>This has however been undermined by Westminster concessions to road haulage lobby - scrapping Fuel Duty Escalator, freezing Vehicle Excise Duty, and go-ahead for general introduction of 44 tonne lorries.</p> <p>Additionally, the Scottish Executive's £1 billion road-building programme acts as an effective subsidy to the road haulage industry.</p>

3. Delivering the Tory manifesto too: the Executive's £1 billion road-building programme

"We acknowledge that the 'predict and provide' approach to road building is unaffordable, unsustainable and, ultimately, self-defeating."
Donald Dewar, 1998¹⁵

Despite Dewar's statement, since 1999 Labour and the Liberal Democrats have put in place a £1 billion road-building programme as damaging as anything implemented by the Tory Scottish Office administrations of the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, the Tories, in their 2003 election manifesto, congratulate the parties for reinstating "the Conservative roads programme."¹⁶

Labour and the Liberal Democrats have, in fact, assembled a roads programme more damaging even than that advocated in 1999 by the Tories.¹⁷ Yet, this is despite neither party, in 1999, mentioning road-building in their election manifestos. At least the Conservatives are consistent in their demands for road construction, seeing this, albeit misguidedly, as a panacea for all transport ills. The disparity between Labour and Lib Dem policy and their decision-making in office however casts genuine doubts about their future trustworthiness.

Table 3.1

Scotland's roads programme... £1 billion and counting	
Scottish Executive committed spend on new trunk roads since 1999	
M74 Northern Extension	£375-500 million
M77 Fenwick-Malletsheugh & Glasgow Southern Orbital	£130 million
A96 Aberdeen western bypass	£120 million
A8 Baillieston-Newhouse	£125-143 million
A80 Stepps-Haggs	£120 million
A876 Kincardine Bridge & A876 Eastern Link Road	£84 million
A1 Haddington-Dunbar	£48.2 million
A78 Ardossan, Saltcoats & Stevenston bypass	£38.9 million
A96 Fochabers-Mosstodloch	£18.3 million
A830 Arisaig-Kinsadel	£11.4 million
Total:	£1.07 – 1.2 billion

The Scottish Executive has since 1999 given the go-ahead to almost every major road proposal left over from the Tory road-building plans of the 1990s. Indeed, with former local authority aspirations such as the Glasgow Southern Orbital road and the Aberdeen western bypass taken into the body of the Executive's trunk road programme, the Labour-led Scottish Executive has delivered a Tory road-building programme and then some. It is now difficult to see the 1997-99 trunk road moratorium as anything other than a delaying device to suit government spending priorities – rather than as the genuine review of the sustainability of road-building as was promised at the time.

The case of the Scottish Executive's road-building programme is particularly striking as this was put in place without proper evaluation: the initial schemes being approved were not evaluated against the Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidelines

¹⁵ From introduction to Transport White Paper 'Travel Choices for Scotland' (Scottish Office: 1998). Before it came to power, Labour was even more unequivocal about its opposition to road-building. In 'In Trust for Tomorrow', its 1994 policy document on the environment, Labour said: "Building new roads offers at best temporary relief from traffic congestion. It is now accepted by almost everyone apart from the [Department of Transport] that new roads generate new traffic. ... Widening existing roads will have the same effect." (As quoted in document 'Roads to Ruin' (Transport 2000: 2001).)

¹⁶ Scottish Conservatives election manifesto 'Time to do something about it', chapter 5.

¹⁷ The Conservatives, in their 1999 manifesto, pledged to increase roads spending, and highlighted the following roads: A77/M77, A96, A1, M80, A828, A75 and the M74.

(the launch of which followed the political commitment to the road programme) or through multi-modal studies. See for example, Begg & Gray (2002: 7) who write:

“The Scottish Executive ignored its own guidance by approving the M74 extension in advance of the findings of the Central Scotland multi-modal study. This would not have happened in England.” [four emphasis]

Advances in - and absences from - multi-modal appraisal

This is not to say that there have been no positive developments in the policy framework. The introduction of multi-modal appraisal and the Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidelines (STAG) are positive steps towards better planning on trunk corridors. The problem is that these policies have been *carefully ignored* when roads such as the M74 Northern Extension and Aberdeen western bypass were given the go-ahead. STAG is a useful addition to policy-making, at least in as much as it promotes objective-led decision-making. Yet it was perhaps useful to the Executive that STAG was brought in after the mass of the road-building programme had been secured - while in the case of the Aberdeen western bypass, a decision had clearly been taken to exempt the project from the correct STAG procedures.

The Edinburgh-East Lothian and Glasgow-Kilmarnock corridors illustrate well the failure of the “predict and provide” methodology rather than a multi-modal approach. In both these instances, major commuting routes into Scotland’s two principal cities, we see major road-building projects implemented whilst rail-based alternatives remain unenhanced.¹⁸ These road projects act as an effective financial subsidy to car use along these corridors, and reduce further the relative attractiveness of the more sustainable options.

For a long time, it had been transparent that planning for transport on trunk routes should be done on a “multi-modal” basis, looking at all transport options together rather than just pursuing road capacity increases as had characterised the “predict and provide” mentality. Hence, the commitment made in the November 1999 trunk road review announcement towards multi-modal studies for the Glasgow-Edinburgh and Glasgow-Stirling corridors was indeed welcome.

Despite a number of concerns over the methodology used in the resulting Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies (CSTCS)¹⁹, the Ministerial decisions announced in January 2003²⁰ were important in as much as they acknowledged the need for traffic restraint and investment in sustainable alternatives. The Ministerial announcement contained a surprising amount of commitment towards implementation of public transport schemes (e.g. an Airdrie-Bathgate rail line) and suggestion, if not definite commitment, that road traffic demand management measures (e.g. ramp metering, High Occupancy Vehicles lanes) may be incorporated in the road projects (M8 Baillieston-Newhouse, A80 Stepps-Haggs). There are however currently widespread doubts as to whether the rail-based elements of the CSTCS Ministerial decisions will be implemented given the ongoing problems of rail industry project delivery – and this will be a challenge for the incoming Executive to take a strategic lead on (see section 4.3, below).

The return to “predict and provide” road-building

While the Scottish Executive’s decisions on the CSTCS provide a high-water mark on planning for trunk transport corridors, the decision made only a week afterwards

¹⁸ The A1 Haddington-Dunbar project will increase car commuting into Edinburgh. There is however no regular interval rail service on the East Coast Main Line along this corridor, infrequent services instead being provided at Dunbar by GNER’s long-distance high-speed trains. The inadequate capacity on the partially single-track rail line between Glasgow and Kilmarnock allows only an hourly rail service; the proposed double-tracking has been delayed for many years— instead £130 million has been devoted to new road-building in the form of the new off-line M77 between Fenwick-Mallettsheugh and the Glasgow Southern Orbital road.

¹⁹ See <http://www.transformscotland.org.uk/info/publications.html> for the various comments TRANSformScotland submitted to the Scottish Executive and its consultants during the Study; TS was represented on the Steering Group of the CSTCS.

²⁰ CSTCS ‘Final Decisions Document’ (January 2003) – http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/CSTCS_FinalDecisions.pdf

that the Executive would fund an Aberdeen western bypass confirms the return to “predict and provide” road-building as the defining characteristic of Scottish Executive policy (see text box, below).²¹

What was remarkable about First Minister Jack McConnell’s announcement was the willingness to ignore the need for independent multi-modal appraisal and to fail to ensure that its own Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidelines had been followed. As such, in Aberdeen, there has been no independent evaluation of the alternatives to major road-building, as was carried out for the CSTCS. Instead, the First Minister’s premature decision to fund this road project entirely undermines the policy framework put in place for decision-making on transport projects. There is little sense in creating transport appraisal frameworks when they are then blatantly ignored when it suits politicians to do so. It seems rather that McConnell’s announcement was a case of the shoring up of a shaky Labour vote in the area.²²

Case Study: Aberdeen western bypass

Alongside the M74, the most damaging part of Labour’s roads programme is the proposal to build a western bypass round Aberdeen. First Minister Jack McConnell announced to a business audience in January 2003 that the Scottish Executive would fund the majority of the project. McConnell’s decision followed a long-running campaign led by the NESTRANS, Aberdeen Chamber of Commerce and the local media.

This change to a road-building dominated strategy is in marked contrast to the recommendations made in 1998 in the Scottish Office’s report ‘Sustainable Transport Study for Aberdeen.’ This document set out how a package of low-cost measures, including parking controls, extended bus priority and improvement to walking and cycling priorities could reduce traffic levels in the city by 29% by 2011. The Study concluded that a western bypass would have minimal impact on congestion reduction in the city area. Unfortunately, this Study has been subsequently effectively “disappeared” and Aberdeen is now to be saddled with a road-building project that will increase traffic levels on the already-congested approaches to the city.

A western bypass for Aberdeen would almost certainly spell the end for the city’s western Green Belt. Given Scotland’s poor record on limiting edge-of-town sprawl, it is fully to be expected that the bypass would be followed by the sort of tin-shed development that has been allowed to proliferate along Edinburgh’s bypass. The likelihood of this being repeated in Aberdeen seems all the more certain given the City Council’s crass decision to allow Aberdeen Football Club plc to relocate its stadium to a Greenfield site at Kingswells. The project will certainly generate longer-distance commuter traffic.

This road project would make more sense if it even addressed the city’s perceived main transport problem: congestion encountered by car users commuting into the city at peak hours. Rather than spending £120 million on an orbital road, perhaps the First Minister should have told Aberdeen City Council to concentrate on the parallel public transport routes into the city?

There has been a specific failure to seriously analyse major additions to the bus network or to look at light rail lines for the key radial routes. Despite being analysed endlessly, there has also been no progress on delivering a frequent, regular interval, Aberdeen Crossrail service (e.g. Stonehaven-Aberdeen-Inverurie). There has been little action on rail freight, despite it being estimated that it would cost just £3 million to provide clearance for 9’6” containers from Elgin/Aberdeen to the hubs of the Scottish rail freight network at Coatbridge and Mossend.

Aberdeen’s new transport strategy, in marked contrast to the sustainable path set out in the ‘Sustainable Transport Study for Aberdeen’, is now biased towards the delivery of one pet road scheme, to the exclusion of local public transport network enhancements, and which is working against - rather than for - environmental protection.

²¹ The summary of the ‘Sustainable Transport Study for Aberdeen’ is available at <http://www.scotland.gov.uk> Aberdeen Friends of the Earth’s briefing ‘Bypassing the Truth’ available at <http://myweb.tiscali.co.uk/aberdeenfoe> summarises arguments against the proposed western bypass.

²² Following the loss of two wards in the city (Kingswells & Langstane) to the Liberal Democrats, Labour lost overall control of the City Council. The Aberdeen North Parliamentary constituency, won in 1999 by Labour’s Elaine Thompson, is also thought to be under threat in May’s election. Perhaps it is not also a coincidence that the Deputy Minister for Transport, Lewis MacDonald, represents an Aberdeen constituency (Aberdeen Central).

Are roads good for the economy?

In Scotland it is often assumed that roads bring development and prosperity. Indeed, for the proposed M74 Northern Extension, it is explicitly the primary motivation. Yet can a case be made for road-building on purely economic grounds?

We would suggest a comparison between Scotland's two major cities. Edinburgh, having finally rejected the major road-building plans that threatened the city between the 1940s and the 1980s, has relatively poor road access but has a thriving economy. Glasgow, on the other hand, has over the past few decades built a number of major inner-urban roads yet continues to have a poor economy. While naturally there are other factors at work in determining the success of economies, there appears no *prima facie* evidence here of a link between road-building and economic development.

Should we expect there to be such a link? The UK Government's leading expert group on roads issues, the Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (SACTRA), in its 1999 report 'Transport and the Economy' rejected any automatic link between transport investment and economic activity. The Scottish Economic Policy Network (Scotecon), in its 2002 report 'Transport and the Scottish Economy', highlighting the lack of available evidence:

"Many people argue strongly that there is a positive link between transport and economic development, but there is only limited evidence, directly relevant to Scotland, concerning the strength of such links. The impact will be more limited in areas that already have a well developed transport infrastructure. Several studies have found that links are weak or non-existent, or even that negative economic effects can arise."

Transport decision-making remains dominated by traffic and economic modelling despite the gaps in knowledge identified by these studies. Scottish transport policy is still beholden to Cost-Benefit Analysis, albeit one which now comes with a mainly qualitative (and mainly ignored) analysis of environmental impacts tagged on.²³

Prior to the 1999 roads review, TRANSform Scotland suggested a set of criteria for determining the acceptability or otherwise of roads schemes (see box below) against a set of policy criteria.

Criteria for judging the acceptability of various roads schemes:

- (1) **Scale of road:** the extent to which a single scheme soaks up a large proportion of a limited budget.
- (2) **Traffic-generating impact:** proximity to large built-up areas with pent-up demand for road space.
- (3) **Feasibility of other mode alternatives:** whether the corridor has realistic prospects for bus / coach priority, rail freight, enhanced passenger rail services, etc.
- (4) **Environmental impact:** is there a net gain from the road e.g. a bypass of modest capacity for a small town may be beneficial whilst e.g. an 8-lane elevated urban motorway is unlikely to.
- (5) **Existing road alternative:** is the existing road link capable of being sensibly enhanced for safety and other benefits e.g. through Route Action Plans, traffic calming, etc.

Yet instead of a serious re-assessment of whether road-building can meet such objectives, there seems to be no evidence of such objective-led thinking in current Scottish transport planning.

²³ The credibility of traffic modelling has not been helped by models suggesting much higher road traffic growth and public transport decline than the actual evidence since 1995. Hypothetical time-savings also sometimes diverge from reality: for example, the original estimates for a 20 minute peak travel time saving from the proposed Ardrrossan-Saltcoats-Stevenston Bypass contrasted with personal experience of actual travel times in 1999 of no more than 14 minutes to traverse the existing route. The 20 minute time saving were based on the erroneous assumption that high traffic growth (in an area showing no growth) would lead to sharp rises in peak travel times and so to large savings from a bypass.

The consequences of the Executive's roads programme

March 2002's 'Transport Delivery Report' correctly identified road traffic growth as unsustainable, stating that *"action is required now to prevent rising carbon dioxide emissions from road transport, localised air pollution ... and social exclusion"* (pp. 1). Indeed, road traffic levels are a good proxy indicator of the socio-economic impact of transport, and in particular climate change emissions. However, the target chosen – to stabilise total vehicle kilometres at 2001 levels by 2021 – is incompatible with the Scottish Executive's commitments on climate change emission reduction. The UK Climate Change Strategy target is to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2010; it also requires the UK transport sector to deliver 40% of all proposed climate change emission reduction. Therefore even if the TDR target for road traffic stabilisation is met, the Scottish transport sector will not be making an adequate contribution to the UK Climate Change Strategy. The TDR 2021 target for traffic levels is even more clearly incompatible in light of the need for further reduction in climate change emissions post-2010 (see RCEP: 2000).

This would all be distressing enough given the Executive's current estimates a 27% growth in road traffic over the next 20 years. So the decision to pour an extra £1 billion into traffic-generating road-building leaves the prospect of the Executive meeting its stated target of stabilising road traffic levels in tatters. Yet given that the long timescale for this task, 20 years, is beyond the shelf-life of most politicians, it is indeed questionable whether there has ever been any commitment from Scottish Executive Ministers or civil servants to meeting this pledge.

The Executive has claimed that its *"transport policies ... reflect our commitments and policies on sustainable development and the environment"*²⁴ Whatever the truth of this claim regarding its *policies*, its *implementation* favours a strategy inimical to the protection of the environment. Current transport spending commitments are likely to worsen environmental conditions in Scotland, perhaps most evidently with regard to climate change commitments.

With transport the fastest growing source of greenhouse gas emissions in Scotland, and with new technology delivering insignificant emission reduction, a complacent acceptance of increased traffic levels must be viewed as an acceptance that climate change is itself acceptable. Without stabilising, and then reducing, traffic levels, there is little prospect of reducing emission levels from the transport sector. There is every likelihood that Scotland, already lagging behind England in performance on climate change emission reduction, will now fall further behind because of the growth in traffic that the Executive's roads programme will undoubtedly generate.

The funds devoted to road-building clearly have an opportunity cost: this is money that could be being used to improve the quality of sustainable transport alternatives. But even within the roads budget, these are funds that could have been used for road maintenance. Yet instead of demonstrating the good business sense of learning to keep an existing asset in good condition, emphasis has been put into building more resources that you cannot afford to maintain.²⁵

The bottom line

The bottom line is that we have had decades of throwing money at road-building and yet traffic is worse than ever. Throwing concrete at congestion problems will provide at best a short-term fix – and will worsen conditions in the longer-run. The go-ahead for the M74 Northern Extension and the Aberdeen western bypass are especially shocking given the damage these roads projects will do.

Unless and until politicians are prepared to match their fine words about "integrated transport" with decisions that will reduce, rather than increase, the impact of

²⁴ 'Scotland's Transport: Delivering Improvements' (2002: 3)

²⁵ The revenue consequences of projects provided by the Public Transport Fund have been raised by some as a concern - yet very little is ever said about the ongoing revenue consequences of maintaining and managing an expanded road network.

transport on communities and the environment, Scotland's record on transport will remain in reverse.

4. Moving Scottish transport forward again: A manifesto for *sustainable* transport

4.1 Road traffic reduction *Deliver an implementation programme for road traffic reduction.*

Too much traffic divides communities and degrades the environment, in rural as well as urban areas. Less traffic would mean fewer air pollution deaths, less congestion costs, less climate change, less social exclusion, less wildlife kill and more jobs.

More fundamentally, the incoming Scottish Executive needs to **plan for a programmed reduction in traffic levels**. The Labour/Lib Dem coalition made a start by setting a traffic stabilisation target (return traffic levels to 2001 levels by 2021) - but this target is weak, long-term, has no interim targets & has no credible implementation programme. The Scottish Executive must now set out a credible implementation programme for road traffic reduction, with targets and timescales, to reduce the volume of traffic on the roads.

With a programme of road traffic reduction in place, Scotland will begin to make a responsible response to our biggest environmental threat: climate change. The Scottish transport sector must begin to contribute to reducing Scottish climate change emissions if we are to make an "equitable contribution" to the UK Climate Change Strategy. A first step should be for the incoming Scottish Executive to set a national, and then sector-by-sector, climate change targets. It is simply intellectually defensible to claim that Scotland does not need to set a target for tackling climate change.

4.2 Review unsustainable road-building commitments *Prioritise investment in sustainable, not unsustainable, transport*

The incoming Scottish Executive must prioritise sustainable transport investment if it is to ensure that modal shift to the sustainable modes of transport happens. The current spending programme is unbalanced; it is heavily skewed towards road-building. If implemented in full, the Scottish Executive's £1 billion road-building programme would effectively remove any prospect of stabilising, and eventually reducing, road traffic levels in Scotland. One of the first tasks of the new administration at Holyrood must be to **review, in sustainability and environmental justice terms, the massive road-building commitments of the past five years**. Continuing with these projects would simply condemn Scotland to yet more traffic and yet more pollution. The incoming Executive needs to move the balance of expenditure from supporting unsustainable modes of transport (private cars, road haulage) to sustainable modes (walking, cycling, public transport, rail & sea freight).

Along with 25 other Scottish groups in the 'Everyone' campaign, coordinated by Scottish Environment LINK, TRANSform Scotland are calling for two-thirds of the Executive's unsustainable £1 billion road-building programme to be transferred into sustainable alternatives. The incoming administration could do this at a stroke by abandoning the most destructive of the road projects - the M74 Northern Extension and the Aberdeen western bypass - which between them will consume £620 million of the Executive's transport budget.

4.3 Air transport

Controlling the most polluting form of transport

Air transport is the most polluting form of transport yet is expanding most rapidly. The UK Government's leading environmental advisory body, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), in its November 2002 report 'The Environmental Effects of Civil Aircraft in Flight' highlighted the inconsistency of facilitating growth in air transport with climate change and sustainable development. The RCEP concluded that the failure for the air transport industry to pay for its external costs through an aviation fuel tax or an emissions charge represents a *"large subsidy at the expense of other modes of transport."* It also concluded that *"a failure to invest in rail infrastructure and a failure to reflect environmental externalities in the cost of air transport"* had undermined the viability of rail alternatives.

Recent UK and Scottish Executive policies have uncritically sought to expand air transport, choosing to ignore the environmental impacts of such a policy. The incoming Executive must **set out policies to control the impact of aviation and set out alternatives for external links** (such as high-speed rail) for domestic and near-European trips.

4.4 Economic instruments

Make transport pay its way - deliver on economic instruments

The success of London's congestion charge scheme demonstrates the need for traffic management strategies to be implemented. Yet, in Scotland, only the City of Edinburgh Council has any plans to implement similar pricing policies – and with scant support from central government. The Scottish Executive, while it has implemented legislation for local authorities, has run a mile from implementing such policies itself, dropping even enabling powers for trunk road user charging from the Transport Act.

The Scottish Executive must **take the lead in ensuring implementation of road user charging in urban areas**. With this in place, we can begin to have a more targeted way of paying for use of the roads but it also allows the revenues to be targeted on providing sustainable alternatives to the car in congested urban areas.

4.5 Planning

Measures to reduce the need to travel

Perhaps most urgent is that we learn to plan to reduce the need to travel, so that we do not repeat the errors of previous decades in undermining local services. The fundamental underpinning of a sustainable transport strategy is whether there are measures in place that reduce the need to travel.

This means taking action that increase the provision of local services, **restricting the number of edge-of-town developments, and putting in place enforceable Green Travel Plans for new developments**.

The Scottish Executive should strengthen local authority development control functions such that all new developments (above a minimum threshold size) have approved and enforced Green Travel Plans with financial penalties if modal share targets are not met within a given time period of opening of the development.

4.6 Healthy transport

Help transport contribute to Scottish public health policy

Walking and cycling, the healthiest and most sustainable modes of transport, need to have much more emphasis in Executive transport planning if it is serious about tackling national public health problems. Yet delivery on walking and cycling has been relegated by the Labour/Lib Dem coalition to being a subset of road safety. Walking remains the second most common journey mode in Scotland yet has been largely ignored by the Executive and the Parliament.

Much more evidence must be put upon programmes of local traffic-reducing “quality of life” measures such as Safe Routes to School, slower speed zones & Home Zones.

In order to give a strategic lead, the Scottish Executive should **set up a Sustainable Travel Branch, in order to maximise the public health and environmental elements of travel**. Its targets would include delivering better local accessibility, modal shift to walking and cycling, reduced traffic pollution, and casualty reduction targets.

The incoming Executive should **replace the now-defunct Public Transport Fund with a Sustainable Transport Fund to support the range of traffic reduction schemes that are currently deprived of financial support**. Schemes that would be eligible for support would include: cycle projects, walking projects, Safe Routes to School, Green Transport Plans, Demand Responsive Transport, traffic calming schemes, rural road traffic calming, Home Zones, local travel awareness initiatives and contributions towards public realm projects that facilitate walking and cycling. Applications should be open to local authorities, and voluntary and community groups.

4.7 Socially-just transport

Deliver a social inclusion audit of transport policy implementation

Social justice perspectives on transport are too often neglected, despite a raft of evidence to suggest that those on lower incomes are disproportionately affected by an unsustainable transport system. Transport affects people directly through road crashes, denial of play space and community severance.

Unfortunately the bulk of investment in transport is still geared towards meeting the demands of the already highly-mobile rather than the needs of those with poor accessibility to where they need to get to. Investment in long-distance, polluting, forms of transport predominates - to the disbenefit of shorter, more benign, forms of transport such as walking, cycling and local public transport. The Executive's roads programme is aimed towards already highly-mobile car users. The spending imbalance sits uneasily with its commitments to social justice: lower income groups are more likely to be negatively affected by increasing road traffic levels, while children from lower income groups are four times more likely to be killed or seriously injured than those from higher socio-economic groups in road crashes.

The incoming Executive should ensure that **transport delivery has a social inclusion audit** so that:

- A fair proportion of transport expenditure goes into the modes of transport used disproportionately by low income groups (walking and bus use).
- Efforts are made to make bus travel more competitive on price terms with car travel, reversing the trend of recent decades;
- Measures that reduce impacts on vulnerable communities (e.g. speed reducing measures & traffic calming) receive priority for investment.

Appendix 1: Dates in the disintegration

1997	Election of UK Labour Government; roads moratorium announced.
July 1998	Scottish Office White Paper on Transport 'Travel Choices for Scotland'
May 1999	Scottish Parliament elections
May 1999	Scottish Executive (SE) formed; Partnership Agreement between Labour & Liberal Democrats
July 1999	Consultation paper 'Tackling Congestion' – enabling powers for urban road user charging, trunk road user charging workplace parking levies.
November 1999	Roads review announcement: go-ahead for M77 Fenwick-Malletsheugh, A1 Haddington-Dunbar, A78 Three Towns Bypass, A96 Fochabers Bypass, A830 Arisaig-Kinsadel
January 2000	Transport Bill launched – bus Quality Contracts, regional transport partnerships, enabling powers for road user charging & workplace parking levies.
September 2000	Fuel protests
January 2001	Transport Act published – enabling powers for workplace parking levies dropped from Act.
September 2001	Spending review: Transport Minister Sarah Boyack accepts case for M74 Northern Extension.
January 2002	SE confirms it will pay for M74 Northern Extension
March 2002	SE Transport Delivery Report 'Scotland's Transport: Delivering Improvements' published
June 2002	Final Reports from Central Scotland Transport Corridor Study published
September 2002	Spending review 'Building a Better Scotland' published. Funding for 'big' transport projects (roads & public transport), no mention of walking or cycling (although all 9-year olds will get a game of golf...).
December 2002	SE transport indicators published
January 2003	Ministerial Decisions on Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies: go-ahead for M8 Baillieston-Newhouse, A80 Stepps-Haggs & Airdrie-Bathgate rail line.
January 2003	SE announces that it will pay for Aberdeen western bypass
March 2003	SE announces that it will pay for two tram lines in Edinburgh
March 2003	SE publishes 'Building Better Transport' – a review of its activity on transport
March 2003	SE publishes Road Orders for M74 Northern Extension – cost of scheme now forecast to be between £375 million & £500 million.

Appendix 2: What Labour & the Lib Dems said they'd do: The text of their 1999 commitments

Key:

SLP refers to the Scottish Labour Party manifesto for the 1999 elections.

SLD refers to the Scottish Liberal Democrat manifesto for the 1999 elections.

PA refers to the Partnership Agreement made by the two parties in May 1999 following the election.

GENERAL POLICY ISSUES

Commitment	Document			References
	SLP	SLD	PA	
Tackle pollution			Yes	"We will tackle pollution" (PA:17)
Reduce dependence on cars		Yes		"Wish to reduce dependence on cars" (SLD: 25)
Balance needs of car users and non-car users	Yes			"We need a transport system that balances the needs of car owners and non car owners" (SLP:13)
Set up regional transport partnerships		Yes	Yes	"Set up regional transport partnerships.." (SLD:26) "We will set up regional transport partnerships to develop transport strategies throughout Scotland" (PA:18)

ROAD TRAFFIC DEMAND MANAGEMENT

Manifesto commitment	Document			References
	SLP	SLD	PA	
Introduce legislation for road user charging	Yes	Yes	Yes	"We will legislate to allow road-user charging where it is sensible to do so.." (SLP:13) "...give the power to local authorities to introduce road-pricing schemes.." (SLD:26) "We will legislate to allow road-user charging where it is sensible to do so" (PA:17)
Introduce legislation for workplace parking levy schemes	Yes	Yes	Yes	"...allow local authorities to charge for workplace charging" (SLP:13) "...tax non-residential parking" (SLD:26) "We will enable local authorities to levy charges on parking at the workplace" (PA:17)
Allow ring-fencing of funds	Yes	Yes	Yes	"We will use the money raised [from road-user charging] to invest in transport improvements" (SLP:13) "Work towards ensuring that money raised from traffic fines and charges is ear-marked for improving public transport." (SLD:26) "The proceeds [from road-user charging and work-place charging] will be used to invest in transport" (PA:17)

WALKING, CYCLING & LIVING STREETS

Commitment	Document			References
	SLP	SLD	PA	
Extend support for walking & cycling	Yes	Yes		<p>"We will develop the safer routes to school policy, as well as extending our support for cycling and walking" (SLP:13)</p> <p>"Support more pedestrian zones, safe cycling routes and traffic calming schemes" (SLD:26)</p>
More pedestrian zones & traffic calming		Yes		"Support more pedestrian zones, safe cycling routes and traffic calming schemes" (SLD:26)

PUBLIC TRANSPORT

Commitment	Document			References
	SLP	SLD	PA	
Create a high quality public transport system	Yes			"Our biggest challenge is to create a high quality, accessible and affordable public transport system" (SLP:13)
Deliver a national timetable information service	Yes	Yes		<p>"We will work towards producing a Scottish National Transport Timetable, integrating all forms of transport" (SLP:13)</p> <p>"...create a first class travel information service for Scottish public transport." (SLD:25)</p>
Deliver a concessionary fare scheme		Yes	Yes	<p>"Support a national concessionary fare scheme on all public transport for pensioners and disabled people" (SLD:26)</p> <p>"We will encourage the improvement and integration of concessionary fare schemes on public transport for pensioners and those with special needs" (PA:17)</p>
Extend bus priority	Yes			"We will also extend bus priority schemes.." (SLP:13)
Extend rail electrification		Yes		"We will support the extension of electrified main railway lines..." (SLD:25)
Introduce light rail		Yes		"we want to see appropriate forms of light railway or metro systems in Glasgow and Edinburgh." (SLD:25)

FREIGHT

Commitment	Document			References
	SLP	SLD	PA	
Shift freight from road to rail	Yes	Yes	Yes	<p>"We will spend an extra £1.5 million on the Freight Facilities Grant to move freight from road to rail" (SLP:13)</p> <p>"Encourage freight onto trains and ships and off the roads" (SLD:26)</p> <p>"We will continue to encourage freight off the roads and onto trains and ships" (PA:18)</p>

Appendix 3: What Labour & the Lib Dems didn't tell us: The Executive's £1 billion road-building programme

This section reports on Scottish Executive committed expenditure on new trunk roads since 1999. Note again that none of these schemes was mentioned in the 1999 party manifestos of Labour or the Liberal Democrats. Some of these schemes – e.g. the Aberdeen western bypass – did not even feature in the manifestos of the Tories!

Note that the information presented here has had to be collated from a number of sources. The Scottish Executive no longer appears to publish documents trumpeting their road-building plans, 'Roads for Prosperity'-style. Maybe they're embarrassed?

M74 Northern Extension

£375-500 million

Description: new 8km dual 3-lane and dual 4-lane motorway across south-east Glasgow²⁶, most of which will be in elevated sections.

Background: In the November 1999 'Strategic Roads Review', the Scottish Executive referred the proposal back to its local authority promoters (Glasgow City Council and South Lanarkshire Council) because of the "substantial volumes of car commuting" the road would carry. The Executive suggested that the local authorities should "review alternative transport solutions in the area."²⁷

Instead of reviewing alternatives to the road proposal, a coalition of Glasgow City, South Lanarkshire and Renfrewshire councils came back to the Scottish Executive in September 2000 with further demands for the project to be paid for by the Scottish Executive.²⁸ Following an extensive lobby campaign led by Glasgow City Council and business groups, then Transport Minister Sarah Boyack made in January 2001 an expenditure commitment of £214 million towards the project.²⁹ The decision to fund the project was made despite the lack of multi-modal appraisal or adequate appraisal of the impacts.

In 2002, an independent study commissioned by the Scottish Executive for the Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies concluded that the project will worsen congestion and environmental conditions in the city.³⁰ The study concluded that Glasgow in 2010 with the M74 scheme built "shows a network which is more congested (even with the additional capacity provided by the M74) than in 2000."³¹

Price: Estimated in 2001 as £245 million (at May 2000 prices), with £214 million from the Scottish Executive, £21.8 million from Glasgow City Council, £4.0 million from South Lanarkshire Council, £2.2 million from Renfrewshire Council and £3.0 million from unspecified "public/private sector funding."³²

In March 2003, in a 'Note to Editors' in an Executive press release,³³ it emerged that the project would cost not £250 million, but between £375 million & £500 million.³⁴ Was it only just coincidental that the Executive should announce this doubling of the price of the motorway just as Parliament was wound up before the election?

Timescales: The Road Orders and Compulsory Purchase Orders were published in March 2003 with a closing date for objections to the Road Orders at May 12th 2003. Spring 2003 to autumn 2004 is scheduled for statutory consultation and conclusion on orders, and possible Public Local Inquiry; autumn 2004 – autumn 2005 for implementation (tendering, awarding of contracts and start of construction); with 2008 scheduled for road opening.³⁵

²⁶ Scottish Executive 'Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions' (November 1999: page 7) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm#b1>

²⁷ Scottish Executive 'Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions' (November 1999: page 8) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm#b1>

²⁸ Glasgow City Council press release 12 September 2000: 'Three Scottish councils unite on M74 extension proposals.'

²⁹ Scottish Executive press release SE0113/2001, 22 January 2001 'M74 completion gets green light – Boyack unveils agreement' - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/news/2001/01/se0113.asp>

³⁰ Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies 'Final Report on M74 Corridor', pages 35-48 and Figures 5.5-5.17.

³¹ Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies 'Final Report on M74 Corridor', page 42, section 5.6.3.

³² Answer to Parliamentary Written Question S1W-15440, 11 May 2001 - http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/official_report/wa-01/wa0511.htm

³³ Scottish Executive press release NRET324LA, 21/03/03 - see <http://www.scotland.gov.uk>

³⁴ This is another example of cost escalation for a road project that has not been questioned: had this occurred for a rail infrastructure project, it would undoubtedly lead to delay while the funding gap was met (see for example the delay to the Edinburgh Crossrail project for this reason). Not so for this road project, this appears to have an unlimited financial commitment.

³⁵ <http://www.m74completion.com/>

M77 Fenwick-Malletsheugh & Glasgow Southern Orbital

£130 million

Description: M77 Malletsheugh–Fenwick is a 15.2km dual 2-lane motorway “generally parallel” to the existing A77.³⁶ GSO is a “9.3 km stretch of dual carriageway from the proposed M77 extension at Malletsheugh, south of Newton Mearns, to the A726 at Philipshill, north-west of East Kilbride.”³⁷

Background: Expenditure commitment for M77 project made in November 1999 ‘Strategic Roads Review’ as a PFI project. It was subsequently decided that the GSO to be tied into M77.

“Construction of this joint project is planned to start in early 2003 with completion in early 2005. Planning permission for GSO was granted in May [2001].”³⁸

Price: M77 scheme estimated in 1999 at £60 million.³⁹ GSO scheme estimated in 2001 at “around £40 million.”⁴⁰ The cost of the joint project had by 2002 increased to £130 million. It is unclear why these combined project increased in price to £130 million.

As a PFI project, the upfront capital cost is not from the Scottish Executive; however, payments to contractors will continue for at least 20 years after 2010.

Timescales: “Connect consortium, including Balfour Beatty Capital Projects and Atkins Investments, will begin construction on the M77 and Glasgow Southern Orbital by the end of March [2003].”^{41 42 43} “The M77 extension and GSO should be open to traffic at the end of 2004 or early in 2005.”⁴⁴

³⁶ Scottish Executive ‘Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions’ (November 1999: page 3) - http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/CSTCS_FinalDecisions.pdf

³⁷ Scottish Executive press release SE5280/2002, 01 February 2002 ‘Key road-building project on the move’ - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2002/02/SE5280.aspx>

³⁸ Scottish Executive press release SE5280/2002, 01 February 2002 ‘Key road-building project on the move’ - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2002/02/SE5280.aspx>

³⁹ Scottish Executive ‘Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions’ (November 1999: page 3) – http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/CSTCS_FinalDecisions.pdf

⁴⁰ Scottish Executive press release SE1422/2001, 14 June 2001 ‘Boyack clears the way for A1 expressway and Glasgow Southern Orbital’ - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/news/2001/06/se1422.asp>

⁴¹ <http://www.ipfa.org/cgi/news/news.cgi?a=378&t=template.htm>

⁴² <http://www.balfourbeatty.co.uk/news/pr1038991717.html>

⁴³ Scottish Executive press release SEet197/2002, 29 November 2002 ‘Preferred bidder for M77 contract appointed’ - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2002/11/SEet197.aspx>

⁴⁴ Scottish Executive press release SE1422/2001, 14 June 2001 ‘Boyack clears the way for A1 expressway and Glasgow Southern Orbital’ - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/news/2001/06/se1422.asp>

Aberdeen Western Bypass

£120 million

Description: The longest proposed continuous section of new road in Scotland at 15-18 miles in length. The new dual carriageway road would run from the A90 south of Aberdeen to the A90 north of the City around the western edge of the city.

Process: Aspiration of Aberdeen City Council & Aberdeenshire Council pushed forward by NESTRANS. Expenditure commitment made by First Minister Jack McConnell in January 2003⁴⁵ in the middle of consultation on the Northern leg of the route and prior to completion of any study of alternatives to the road.

Now officially a Trunk Road scheme carried forward by the Scottish Executive, although the local authorities continue to lead the project work.

Price: £120million.

The Executive has agreed to meet 81% of the estimated total cost of the £120 million bypass with 19% - the 'local' elements – being funded equally by the councils. The local authorities' contribution of just under £23 million of the total cost will be split equally between the City and Aberdeenshire.

The more sceptical reader would add another £30million to the costs to allow for the proposed 'strategic roads' improvements in Aberdeen. This covers further work on the A90 to the north and south of the City.

Timescales: Preparatory work is ongoing with construction to start in 2007 for opening by 2010.

A8 Baillieston-Newhouse

£125-143 million

Description: Widening of A8 to "dual three-lane equivalent motorway."⁴⁶

Process: The project was rejected in the November 1999 'Strategic Roads Review' because the project was "*unaffordable in the short- to medium- term*" and "*the new section of motorway would carry a significant volume of cars on commuting trips.*"⁴⁷ The Executive decided "*it would be inconsistent with its integrated transport strategy to approve such a major new road scheme before carrying out [multi-modal] appraisal.*"⁴⁸

The ensuing multi-modal study, the Central Scotland Transport Corridor Study (CSTCS), recommended that the project, along with associated traffic management measures, proceed. The Ministerial decision in January 2003 made an expenditure commitment for the project in general terms. There remains a decision to be taken on part of the route (see below).⁴⁹

Price: The CSTCS A8 project was estimated in 2003 as follows: "*A8 on the line of the existing road is in the order of £105 million and £123 million if partly built off-line.*"⁵⁰ The projects announced in March 2002 add another £20 million.

Timescales: "preparatory work to start immediately for the scheme to be operational prior to 2010."⁵¹

⁴⁵ <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2003/03/SEet317.aspx> - Scottish Executive news release Sefm/100/2003, 27/01/03.

⁴⁶ Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies 'Final Decisions Document' (January 2003: page 6) -

http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/CSTCS_FinalDecisions.pdf

⁴⁷ Scottish Executive 'Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions' (November 1999: page 6) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm#b0>

⁴⁸ Scottish Executive 'Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions' (November 1999: page 6) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm#b0>

⁴⁹ Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies 'Final Decisions Document' (January 2003: page 7) -

http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/CSTCS_FinalDecisions.pdf

⁵⁰ Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies 'Final Decisions Document' (January 2003: page 7) -

http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/CSTCS_FinalDecisions.pdf

⁵¹ Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies 'Final Decisions Document' (January 2003: page 8) -

http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/CSTCS_FinalDecisions.pdf

A80 Stepps-Haggs

£120 million

Description: *"The A80 between Haggs and the Stepps Bypass will be upgraded to motorway standard providing [an off-line] new two lane bypass of Moodiesburn; widening the [on-line] section between Moodiesburn and Auchenkilns to 3 lanes and upgrading [on-line] the existing two lane A80 between Auchenkilns and Haggs including the provision of hard shoulders."*⁵²

Process: The project was rejected in the November 1999 'Strategic Roads Review' because the project was *"unaffordable in the short- to medium- term"* and because *"the project would carry a significant volume of cars on commuter trips."*⁵³ The Executive decided that this scheme should also be subject to multi-modal appraisal.

In the ensuing study, the consultants recommended that high-occupancy vehicles lanes be implemented on the fourth lane at Condorrat between Auchenkilns and Mollinsburn to provide demand management.

The Ministerial decision in January 2003 acknowledged that building the road to a smaller scale with only two and three lane sections between Haggs and Stepps Bypass would provide much needed constraint on commuter traffic growth along the route.

In addition to the CSTCS project, the Executive has fast-tracked construction of a grade-separated Auchenkilns junction on the A80 and junction improvements at Shawhead on the A725, justifying these projects as *"easing congestion on the A8."*⁵⁴

Price: Estimated in 2003 at £120 million.⁵⁵

Timescales: *"Preparatory work will start immediately for the scheme to be operational prior to 2010."*⁵⁶

A876 Kincardine Bridge & A876 Eastern Link Road

£83.95 million

Description: Second Kincardine Bridge parallel to existing Kincardine Bridge, doubling capacity on the Upper Forth crossing. The Eastern Link Road will divert traffic from town of Kincardine on to the existing Bridge: the section from the end of the present M876 to the Kincardine Bridge will be dualled.

Process: Second Kincardine Bridge proposal was analysed in 1999 roads review.

Price: Kincardine Bridge estimated in 1999 at £60 million.⁵⁷ Price had risen by 2002 to £71 million.⁵⁸ Price of Eastern Link road put in 2003 at £12.95 million.⁵⁹

Timescales: Scottish Executive wants construction of Eastern Link Road to begin in summer 2003. Draft Orders for the Bridge to be published in summer 2003, with opening projected for 2008.⁶⁰

⁵² Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies 'Final Decisions Document' (January 2003: page 12) - http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/CSTCS_FinalDecisions.pdf

⁵³ Scottish Executive 'Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions' (November 1999: page 7) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm#b0>

⁵⁴ Scottish Executive press release SE5565/2002, 21 March 2002 'Funding to ease congestion on A8 and A80' - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2002/03/SE5565.aspx>

⁵⁵ Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies 'Final Decisions Document' (January 2003: page 12) - http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/CSTCS_FinalDecisions.pdf

⁵⁶ Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies 'Final Decisions Document' (January 2003: page 12) - http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/CSTCS_FinalDecisions.pdf

⁵⁷ Scottish Executive 'Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions' (November 1999: page 9) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm#b2>

⁵⁸ Scottish Executive press release SEat228/2002, 23 December 2002 'New bridge at Kincardine' - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2002/12/SEat228.aspx>

⁵⁹ Answer to Parliamentary Written Question S1W-34910, March 2003 - see answer to S1W-34908 at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/webapp/result_wa

⁶⁰ Scottish Executive press release SEat228/2002, 23 December 2002 'New bridge at Kincardine' - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2002/12/SEat228.aspx>

A1 Haddington-Dunbar

£48.2 million

Description: 13.8km dual carriageway “built to near motorway standards ... parallel to and immediately south of” the existing road.⁶¹

Process: Expenditure commitment made in November 1999 ‘Strategic Roads Review.’

Price: Estimated in 1999 at £32 million.⁶² Price had by 2001 risen to “around £40 million.”^{63 64} Price had by 2002 risen to £48.195 million.⁶⁵

Timescales: Currently under construction, opening expected in 2004.

A78 Bypass of Ardrossan, Saltcoats and Stevenston

£38.95 million

Description: “The proposed bypass will be a dual carriageway with two lanes in each direction and will run for 6.4 km.”⁶⁶

Process: Expenditure commitment made in November 1999 ‘Strategic Roads Review.’

Price: Estimated in 1999 at £26 million.⁶⁷ Executive road spending data indicates price had by 2003 risen to £38.95 million⁶⁸ although Executive publicly states price as £28 million.⁶⁹

Timescales: construction scheduled to begin in summer 2003.⁷⁰

A96 Fochabers – Mosstodloch

£18.3 million

Description: 5km “wide single carriageway bypass of the settlements of Fochabers and Mosstodloch.”⁷¹

Process: Expenditure commitment made in November 1999 ‘Strategic Roads Review.’

Price: Estimated in 1999 at £12 million.⁷² Price had by 2001 risen to £18.32 million.⁷³

Timescales: Public Local Inquiry expected this year.

⁶¹ Scottish Executive ‘Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions’ (November 1999: page 3) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm>

⁶² Scottish Executive ‘Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions’ (November 1999: page 3) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm>

⁶³ Scottish Executive press release SE1422/2001, 14 June 2001 ‘Boyack clears the way for A1 expressway and Glasgow Southern Orbital’ - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/news/2001/06/se1422.asp>

⁶⁴ Scottish Executive press release SE4599/2002, 12 March 2002 ‘Contract awarded to upgrade A1’ - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2002/03/SE4599.aspx>

⁶⁵ Answer to Parliamentary Written Question S1W-24007, 25 March 2002 - http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/official_report/wa-02/wa0325.htm

⁶⁶ Scottish Executive ‘Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions’ (November 1999: page 4) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm>

⁶⁷ Scottish Executive ‘Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions’ (November 1999: page 4) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm>

⁶⁸ Answer to Parliamentary Written Question S1W-24007, 25 March 2002 - [Answer to Parliamentary Written Question S1W-34910, March 2003 – see http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/webapp/result_wa](http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/webapp/result_wa)

⁶⁹ Scottish Executive press release SEET190/2002, 21 November 2002 ‘Three Towns A78 Bypass’ - http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2002/11/t_SEET190.aspx

⁷⁰ Scottish Executive press release SEET190/2002, 21 November 2002 ‘Three Towns A78 Bypass’ - http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2002/11/t_SEET190.aspx

⁷¹ Scottish Executive ‘Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions’ (November 1999: page 5) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm>

⁷² Scottish Executive ‘Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions’ (November 1999: page 5) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm>

⁷³ Answer to Parliamentary Written Question S1W-24007, 25 March 2002 - http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/official_report/wa-02/wa0325.htm

A830 Arisaig - Kinsadel**£11.4 million**

Description: "construction of 7km of new two-lane carriageway on the A830 Fort William to Mallaig road."⁷⁴

Process: Expenditure commitment made in November 1999 'Strategic Roads Review.'

Price: Estimated in 1999 at £10 million.⁷⁵ Price had by 2002 risen to £11.422 million.⁷⁶

Timescales: Under construction, opening expected this year.

Total price of the Executive's road-building programme:**£1070.8 million-
£1213.8 million**

⁷⁴ Scottish Executive 'Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions' (November 1999: page 4) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm>

⁷⁵ Scottish Executive 'Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions' (November 1999: page 4) - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/travelchoices/docs/tsrr-02.htm>

⁷⁶ Answer to Parliamentary Written Question S1W-24007, 25 March 2002 - http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/official_report/wa-02/wa0325.htm

Appendix 4: And Scotland's roads programme doesn't stop there...

4.1 Tory Scottish Office road projects still being paid for.

A74(M)/M74

Description: 28km dual 3-lane motorway southwards towards English border. Built massively overscale.

Process: Planned & delivered by Tory-led Scottish Office. Completed under Labour-run Scottish Office.

Price: The Scottish Executive is paying about £25 million per annum to the Autolink private consortium as a shadow toll Design, Build, Finance & Operate (DBFO) style PFI expected to cost £214 million at Net Present Value using 6% discount rate [National Audit Office report, 1999, p.1]. Contract also includes operation and maintenance of 92 km of route between Millbank and border with England.

The Scottish Executive refuses to disaggregate the price of the contract between the price of constructing the road & the price of maintaining it. Instead it chooses, somewhat dishonestly, to treat the whole project price as a revenue expenditure in statistical publications such as Scottish Transport Statistics for what is largely a capital project (i.e. road-building).

Timescales: The road is open - but the payments continue.

4.2 Capacity-increasing Scottish Executive road projects hidden in road maintenance & management budgets

It is difficult to decide which of the projects described in the Scottish Executive's annual road maintenance and management expenditure programmes are projects aimed at maintaining the existing asset base, and which are, in fact, capacity-increasing road-building projects. We suspect that the Scottish Executive wants to maintain this confusion!

For example, we are not clear which of the five new projects on the A77 announced by First Minister Jack McConnell in February 2003 involve major increases in capacity on this (project price £13.92 million, see Scottish Executive press release SEfm132/2003, 21 February 2003). It is thought that these projects may not have large impact in terms of route capacity but would give small time savings. McConnell's announcement was certainly more significant for its support for the ferry company Stena to move its terminal operation from the rail-connected Stranraer to *not* rail-connected Cairnryan.

The following project is however a good example of road capacity increase being hidden within what otherwise looks like maintenance & management budgets. This project will have further undermined the time savings benefits of rail on this corridor. The A1 has had no multi-modal analysis north of the English border; instead, what we appear to be seeing is road-building by stealth.

A1 additions south of Dunbar

Description: Three sections of dual carriageway, 5.1km in total.

Process: Planned & delivered by Tory-led Scottish Office. Completed under Labour-run Scottish Office.

Price: £11.4 million [PQ S1W-14599, 04/01]

Timescales: 2 of the 3 sections were new schemes added in March 2001 [PQ SE0818/2001, 27 March 2001]; sections either already opened or under construction.

4.3 Significant local authority road projects

This table sets out a few of the more well-known local authority road projects that will potentially deliver large traffic increases on the local road network, and which may generate traffic on the trunk road network.

Information is often sketchy on local authority roads projects and reflects the extremely low level of information disseminated on most of these projects. **We would also issue a health warning as to the accuracy of the information presented in this section:** again, we would welcome clarification from those in the know.

This table does not include the host of local authority road-building wishlists highlighted in, for example, CoSLA's document "The Weakest Links" of February 2001. Many of these projects would have serious landscape and environmental implications - although some would also be expected to have significant traffic-generating impact.

M9 Spur extension / A90 upgrading (A8000)

Description: 2.8km dual 2-lane motorway, off-line of existing A8000 on access to Forth Road Bridge. Was considered as part of 1999 trunk road review but was passed back to the local authorities to take forward.

Process: Project led by The City of Edinburgh Council - *proving that it are not averse to a bit of road-building when it suits!* The road is likely to be adopted as a trunk road once open so could, arguably, be added to trunk road programme detailed in Appendix 3.

Price: £15 million [Strategic Roads Review, 11/99]; £15 million [PQ S1W-666, 26/08/99].^{77 78}

Timescales: Project to be funded by Forth Road Bridge tolls. Project proceeding to Public Local Inquiry with projected completion by 2006/07.

A92 dualling, Dundee to Arbroath

Description: Unclear.

Process: DBFO project.

Price: Not known.

Timescales: Construction expected to start summer 2003, completion to take 2 years.

A701 dual-carriageway

Description: 4.5km off-line dual-carriageway between Edinburgh City Bypass and Milton Bridge, north of Penicuik.

Process: Aspiration of Midlothian Council. Then Scottish Executive Transport Minister Sarah Boyack decided not to call in Midlothian Council's application for Public Local Inquiry despite over 700 local objections. Tory Scottish Office had previously contributed £2.5 million from Transport Challenge Fund in 1996 for development of the road project. Scottish Executive is now paying for multi-modal study to be carried out on the corridor - yet Midlothian Council are committed to building the road whatever the outcome!

Price: Estimated at £18.5 million.

Timescales: Construction in stages as funds available. A massively-overscale £2 million roundabout was constructed at Gowkley Moss in 2002, heightening local fears that the road project is mainly about opening up Greenbelt land for commercial development.

⁷⁷ <http://www.edinburgh.gov.uk/traffic/A8000/Index.html>

⁷⁸ http://download.edinburgh.gov.uk/traffic/A8000_upgrade.pdf

Finnieston Bridge, Glasgow

Description: Bridge from SECC to Pacific Quay.

Process: Aspiration of Scottish Enterprise Glasgow and Glasgow City Council.

Price: The Herald newspaper estimated the price at £18 million.

Timescales: Not known.

“East End Regeneration Route”, Glasgow

Description: Dual-carriageway planned to link M74 Northern Extension to M8/M80 at Provan. Glasgow City Council's road-building plans do not end with the M74!

Process: Aspiration of Glasgow City Council.

Price: Not known.

Timescales: Not known.

Appendix 5. Double standards in the delivery of transport

It is apparent that there are double standards operated by the Scottish Executive when it comes to delivering trunk road schemes and delivering sustainable transport. Here we look at three examples: buses, cycling and railways.

Local bus services

Case Study 1:

Waiting for the bus, 1999-2003

Gregor McAbery, Aberdeen Friends of the Earth

The humble bus remains the most frequently used form of public transport in Scotland. In the past few years, the Executive has encouraged the use of **Quality Partnership** agreements between bus operators and councils in return for funding infrastructure improvements like bus shelters, bus priority measures and innovative information systems such as real-time information.

In Aberdeen, **First's Twintrack project** has been the most important element of the Quality Partnership. In return for infrastructure improvements like better shelters, real-time, and bus priority, First have replaced the majority of the fleet with low-floor and low-emission buses. Yet it is not clear whether First are getting maximum value for their investment while bus shelter maintenance remains inadequate and the council has plans to restrict bus lane operation. The existing bus lanes themselves are not adequately enforced although cameras are due to be fitted to some lanes and buses in the coming months.

Aberdeen is now served by a network of key high frequency branded routes offering interchange opportunities to other services. Traveline hope to make real-time SMS information available in Aberdeen. First in Aberdeen vehicles are already fitted with Automatic Vehicle Location devices for the 125+ real-time bus stop displays funded through Twintrack and Quality Partnership work.

Traveline has brought phone and internet information to potential users, but work remains to make that information as easily digested and accurate as possible. One major step will be the provision of stop by stop journey planning rather than the current fare stage related service that may not help those new to a route. This level of information will be brought forward to allow the SMS scheme to operate.

A lack of consistent service levels in some areas of Scotland is pushing politicians towards **Quality Contracts**, a previously unused measure in the toolbox that remains unpopular with operators. QCs could allow quality control on poorer performing routes and prevent operators running competing services or it could backfire and make the bus inflexible and unresponsive to public needs and market pressures. Politicians and officials who may never use public transport would be in a position of dictating service levels and routes.

Park & Ride has been a big success with Ferrytoll in Fife and sites in Aberdeen showing the way to attract users from their cars to high-quality buses with effective bus priority, real-time information and good waiting rooms. Many more sites are planned including more around Edinburgh, Aberdeen, and the first bus P&R sites for Glasgow. The only criticism so far would be a lack of evening and Sunday services at some sites and inadequate marketing by councils and the Executive.

Free off-peak concessionary travel has been a PR success for operators and the Executive, although it has brought into sharp focus problems with older inaccessible vehicles. The lack of a national scheme means that some people are better served than others. Executive funding for the scheme has been criticised as inadequate to meet the recent expansion of entitlement to 60yr old men. Proposals to make the scheme truly national and provide a young persons concession appear in current manifestos.

Despite the noted investment and increased bus patronage it appears that **politicians and officials remain disinterested in the bus** and unwilling to fight for funding towards network expansion. Funding is practically nothing compared to road or rail spending. This is shown in Aberdeen by the lack of any plans for new normal bus services in the NESTRANS or "Modern Transport System" publications whilst a £120 million road is promoted. The emphasis is firmly on P&R and the car user rather than on encouraging reduced car use or indeed car-free households.

Walking, cycling & living streets

Perhaps the most tragic change in Scotland's transport over the past decade has been the move from walking as the most common journey to that of car use. Walking remains the second most common mode of transport in Scotland yet remains almost completely ignored by politicians and the media. If the Executive's targets for physical activity are to be met, and the overall health of the population to be improved, investment in walking, and cycling for those for whom this is an option, should have high priority.

Case Study 2:

Scottish Executive cycling policy, 1999-2003

Dave du Feu of Spokes, the Lothian Cycle Campaign

In the first years of the Scottish Parliament, the Executive lived up to the 1999 Labour manifesto commitment of '*extended support for walking and cycling*'. Transport increasingly considered accessibility of people and goods to facilities, local as well as remote, for example through new policies on planning. Transport Minister Sarah Boyack put in place mechanisms, through Public Transport Fund (PTF) bids and Cycling, Walking & Safer Streets (CWSS) allocations, which increased overall SE funding support for local authority cycle project expenditure substantially - though actual local cycle spending depended hugely on each authority's interest. Boyack greatly raised the profile of cycling and walking amongst professionals and policy-makers through speeches, official guidance and structures like the Executive's CWSS branch. This branch showed "*the importance the Executive attaches to developing more sustainable travel choices*" [Scottish Executive Cycle Forum, 09/03/01]. Edinburgh and Glasgow councils, which made the most of these opportunities, doubled cycle usage between 1996 and 2002 [see 'Spokes 84'].

For such initiatives, and notwithstanding our criticism of Executive surrender to the roads lobby on issues such as the M74 and road-user charging, Spokes gave the Executive full credit [see 'Spokes 77' & '79']. Unfortunately we can no longer do so, for Sarah Boyack's cycling initiatives suffered severely under subsequent ministers Wendy Alexander and Iain Gray - not through antagonism, but as a side-effect of their new vision of transport being primarily about big infrastructure. As Iain Gray admitted to Green MSP Robin Harper in Parliament [5 March 2003, column 18982], "*It is fair to say that [cycling and walking] tend to be overlooked in infrastructure improvements.*" Of course, this is not necessarily the case, as many local authority and even Executive projects demonstrate - but it accurately reflects his own speeches and actions, overlooking walking and cycling policy and the impact on them of his 'big' decisions.

The CWSS branch after just one year lost its head, and was subsumed into Road Safety, due to "*the requirement to address other work pressures*" [SE letter]. Likewise the PTF, with its cycle-friendly Guidance, is ending - with no announcement of successor incentives for local authority cycle project work. Yet our annual survey of Scottish mainland local authority cycle project expenditure [see 'Spokes 83'], widely circulated within the Executive, shows that the cycle element of successful 2002/03 local authority PTF bids comprised £4m - compared to just £3m for local authority cycle projects from all other sources combined. The Executive's much-vaunted CWSS non-competitive allocation, whilst welcome, provided just £1m (part of the above £3m) for cycle projects, and has several drawbacks [see 'Spokes 83']. Spokes is attempting to force Executive recognition that the PTF, not CWSS, currently provides the bulk of council cycle project expenditure, and that a new scheme providing at least equivalent sums and incentives is essential.

The word accessibility now rarely emerges from the mouths of ministers - and when it does we are talking about an airport, not the local shop, library or workplace. The 58-page Executive spending plan 'Building a Better Scotland 2003-2006' does not once mention cycling or walking as transport, though it does find space to promise all children a game of golf by age 9. The 44-page Labour 2003 election manifesto, unlike its predecessor above, considers walking not as a means of access to be promoted but solely in the contexts of reducing injuries and of fitting car-exhaust filters. And whilst Executive officials assure us that the target to quadruple cycle use from 1996 to 2012 remains, the Labour manifesto entirely omits all mention of cycling.

Case Study 3:

Running late: delays in rail delivery, 1999-2003

David Hansen of Railfuture

The Executive would cite the very long timescales in delivering rail schemes. They have a point. It is widely accepted that the current structure of the industry does not lend itself to rapid delivery of infrastructure projects. It has taken the Executive four years *not* to deliver the Larkhall line, a scheme first mooted in the early 1990s, while the contractual problems associated with delivering a single rail station at Edinburgh Park are well documented.

Despite the interest of the Executive in delivering additions to the rail network, the only railway opening delivered since 1999 is the 0.9 mile Edinburgh Crossrail service, with the trains running over upgraded track. Even here it should be noted that the funding for this project was provided in November 1998 by the Scottish Office prior to the creation of the Scottish Executive. With less than one mile of new services serving new locations opened in four years, and given Scottish Executive aspiration for re-opening about 60 miles of new railway (Borders rail, Larkhall etc.), it would take 240 years at the current rate of progress!

The sluggish progress on rail scheme delivery is in contrast to the rapid progress made by heritage railways, run by people in their spare time. At Dufftown and Boat of Garten, 15 miles have been added to these networks. Had it not been so damaging a project, it would have been amusing to note that the first new railway delivered in Scotland under the Executive was a funicular railway bulldozed into the Northern Corries of the Cairngorms.

Running late: where have Scotland's rail schemes got to?

Edinburgh Crossrail	<i>Delivered in part; Edinburgh Park station over 5 years late.</i>
Larkhall-Milngavie	<i>Work still not started.</i>
Sirling-Alloa-Kincardine freight line	<i>Parliamentary Bill submitted; funding not confirmed.</i>
Borders Railway	<i>Many promises, no action.</i>
Edinburgh South Suburban Railway	<i>Analysed to death.</i>
Glasgow Crossrail	<i>Promised since 1970s, no action.</i>
Aberdeen Crossrail	<i>Several failed attempts, still no action.</i>
Aberdeen-Inverness track upgrades	<i>Umpteen reports, no action.</i>
East Lothian & Berwickshire local service / Carlisle - Beattock - Glasgow local service	<i>Relatively cheap: should be part of next ScotRail franchise.</i>
Glasgow Airport rail link / Edinburgh Airport rail link	<i>No money to build - just more money to study these.</i>
Dornoch Bridge	<i>Promised over a decade ago - but no will to deliver.</i>

Belatedly, in the months running up to the 2003 elections, and presumably in the face of repeated criticism of its pitiful record on delivering rail projects, the Scottish Executive has been making a series of commitments in this area. If you believe these pre-election statements, then we may eventually have rail lines to Edinburgh and Glasgow airports, a rail line to the Borders and two tram lines in Edinburgh. Yet, unlike the roads programme, none of these schemes yet have phasing of funding confirmed (1). It is informative that the Scottish Executive can lay out expected annual funding streams for road projects just two months after Executive funding commitment was made (2) yet it cannot state annual funding streams for rail schemes such as Stirling-Alloa-Kincardine, a project which has had government support for over five years. There are double standards here, and, on current form, it would not be surprising to see these rail projects further delayed.

While the Scottish Executive acts as the delivery agent for every trunk road scheme that it commits itself to, it has displayed a lack of leadership when it comes to delivering trunk rail schemes. The Scottish Executive appears instead very keen to pass the buck on to local authorities and to private companies. While these latter bodies should certainly be involved in the planning of these projects, it is a major discrepancy that building trunk road schemes should be a core function of the Scottish government yet the construction of trunk rail schemes should be palmed off on to others.

The Borders rail project, for instance, a scheme which still has no Scottish Executive funding commitment for construction, is led by the local authorities through which the project passes rather than by the Scottish Executive. The proposed reopening of the Bathgate-Airdrie rail line, a project which received a promise of Ministerial support in the CSTCS announcement of January 2003, has already apparently been rejected by the Scottish Executive Ministers as a project that they should take the lead in delivering (3).

There have been many promises on rail in the last two months before the election. The challenge for the incoming Executive will be to deliver on these promises and not let the delays continue.

Notes:

- (1) See answer to Parliamentary Question S1W-34906.
- (2) A funding profile for the Aberdeen western bypass was available only 2 months after the Ministerial commitment was made - see answer to PQ S1W-34910.
- (3) Robin Harper MSP failed to get a straight response from Transport Minister Iain Gray to his Parliamentary Question about who would have responsibility for delivering the Airdrie-Bathgate rail line re-opening that Gray had promised in the January 2003 CSTCS announcement. Harper had requested a commitment that the Executive take the lead on delivery of this project; Gray, in response, said that there would be "engineering study" and that this represents the first stage of building the rail line. He didn't however make it clear who would have overall responsibility for delivery of this project: it is hard to imagine this situation being tolerated if this was a trunk road project. See http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/official_report/session-03/sor0227-02.htm

References

- Begg, David & Gray, David (2002): 'Is enough being spent on Transport in Scotland?' (Aberdeen: Robert Gordon University Centre for Transport Studies)
- Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998): 'A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone - The Government's White Paper on the Future of Transport'
- Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2000): 'Climate Change Draft UK Programme'
- Howden, Colin (2001): 'Transport expenditure in Scotland - our best guess' - paper to TRANSform Scotland seminar, 06/11/01 (unpublished)
- Howden, Colin (2003): 'Heading in the Right Direction?' (Edinburgh: TRANSform Scotland)
- MVA et al. (2002): 'Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies: M74 Corridor Final Report - The Corridor Plan to 2010'
- Partnership Agreement (1999)
- Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (2000): 'Energy - The Changing Climate'
- Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (2002): 'The Environmental Effects of Civil Aircraft in Flight'
- Scottish Conservatives (2003): election manifesto 'Time to do something about it'
- Scottish Economic Policy Network (2002): 'Transport and the Scottish Economy'
- Scottish Executive (1999): 'Strategic Roads Review: Scheme Decisions'
- Scottish Executive (2001): 'Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidance'
- Scottish Executive (2002): 'Scotland's Transport: Delivering Improvements'
- Scottish Executive (2002): 'Building a Better Scotland'
- Scottish Executive (2003): 'Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies - Ministerial Decisions Final Decisions Document'
- Scottish Executive (2003): 'Building Better Transport' - <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/transport/bbtr-00.asp>
- Scottish Liberal Democrat manifesto (1999)
- Scottish Labour Party (1999): 'Building Scotland's Future' (Scottish Parliamentary election manifesto)
- Scottish Labour Party (2003): 'On your side - Scottish Labour's Manifesto 2003'
- Scottish Office (1998): 'Sustainable Transport Study for Aberdeen'
- Scottish Office (1998): 'Travel Choices for Scotland - The Scottish Integrated Transport White Paper'
- Scottish Forum for Transport and the Environment (2002): 'Making the Links'
- Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (1999): 'Transport and the Economy' (London: Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions)
- Transport 2000 (2001): 'Roads to Ruin: The environmental impact of Labour's new roads programme' (London: Transport 2000)

About this report

This report sets out how Scottish Executive transport policy failed to deliver during the first term of the Scottish Parliament. The report conducts a detailed critique of Executive policy - and how implementation diverged from this.

About TRANSform Scotland

TRANSform Scotland was launched in November 1997. Our fifty-seven member organisations - including transport operators, local authorities, national environment campaigns and local transport groups - support the development of sustainable transport policies and structures for Scotland.